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Abstract 
This paper provides a quantitative quantitative characterization of how diversifying firms chose 
target industry, with an emphasis on target market and resource-/capability characteristics. We 
seek to improve on the existing literature by using two population level samples instead of the 
more restricted samples others have used, by removing important restrictions on the types of 
relatedness that can be captured, and by including measures of resource strength in addition to 
measures of relatedness.   
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WHY THERE? A DECOMPOSITION OF THE CHOICE OF TARGET INDUSTRY  
 
The literature on corporate diversification has in recent years had its primary focus on the 
possible existence of a diversification discount, and whether the reported discount disappears 
when controlling for the endogeneity of the diversification decision (Berger and Ofek, 1995; 
Campa and Keida, 2002; Lang and Stulz, 1994; Maksimovic and Phillips, 2002; Santalo and 
Becerra, 2008; Villalonga, 2004a, 2004b).  This question is of course of crucial importance, but 
regardless of whether there is a diversification discount, the firms that do decide to diversify (or 
to diversify further) still have to decide which industries to target. This paper addresses this latter 
issue;  i.e. given that a firm decides to diversify, what determines the choice of target industry?  
This question received considerable attention in the 1980s and 90s, but much less so in the past 
decade (e.g. Chatterjee and Wernerfelt, 1991; Farjoun, 1994; Lemelin, 1982; Montgomery and 
Hariharan, 1991; Silverman 1999). 
What we aim to bring to the table here is an examination of the broad patterns in the choice 
of target industry, in other words something similar in spirit to what the variance decomposition 
studies have done for corporate performance (McGahan and Porter1997; Rumelt, 1991; Short, 
Ketchen, Palmer and Hult, 2007).  Our intended contribution is therefore not new theory, but an 
examination of the relative importance and tradeoffs among variables identified in the received 
literature. Specifically, while most strategy researchers would presumably argue that industry 
attractiveness (Porter, 1980, 1985, 1987) and variables describing the relevance and strength of a 
firms preexisting resources and capabilities (Chatterjee and Wernerfelt, 1991; Montgomery and 
Wernerfelt, 1988; Penrose, 1959; Rumelt, 1974) are the most important factors in the choice of 
target industry, we do not know of any population level studies that can quantify how the 
probability of entry changes for a  given change  in such variables, how decision makers are 
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willing to trade off the different variables, and how much the different variables contribute to 
explain those decisions diversifying firms actually make. Existing work is limited either by 
sampling from a particular sector, such as manufacturing or publicly listed firms only (Chatterjee 
and Wernerfelt. 1991; Silverman, 1999),  by restricting attention to a particular type of 
relatedness for example technological resources, human resource profiles or input ratios 
(Farjoun, 1994; Lemelin, 1982; Montgomery and Hariharan, 1992; Silverman, 1999) or from 
restrictions that arise from using SIC-distances as a proxy for relatedness (Chatterjee and 
Wenererfelt, 1991).  We include all industries, and use a measure of relatedness designed to 
capture all kinds of relatedness.    
We said above that we think of this as similar in spirit to the variance decomposition 
literature. One reason for using this analogy is that as in that literature we identify broad 
quantitative empirical patterns, and among them how much “variance” different variables 
explain. The quotation mark in the previous sentence refers to the fact in the present study we 
examine a dichotomous dependent variable, so we are using different statistical techniques that 
renders the analogy less than perfect. Another similarity is that as in that literature, an important 
underlying tension is the horserace between theory inspired by industrial organization  and 
theory typically considered to belong to the resource based-/capabilities view. There are of 
course numerous other similarities and differences that will become clearer as we proceed. 
To be able to characterize how firms choose target industries, and which variables explain 
those decisions, we rely on an unusually detailed population level dataset from the first half of 
the 1980s (AGSM Trinet). While somewhat dated, this sample has compensating advantages in 
its comprehensiveness and detail in terms of industry participation. Compared to Compustat, 
which only includes publicly listed firms, it provides full coverage of all firms (Voigt, 1993). 
Compustat is also based on SEC-filings, which requires separate reporting of all segments that 
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constitute 10% or more  of turnover. Trinet is a bottom up dataset, built from establishment level 
data. This means that Trinet provides a much more detailed breakdown of corporate portfolios 
than Compustat.   
Another critical tool is that we use a fully continuous measure of inter-industry relatedness. 
This crucial variable is often measured using distances in the SIC or NACE systems. Since these 
classification systems are not truly continuous they impose statistical restrictions that do not 
apply to the survivor based approach we employ here. Equally important is that our procedure is 
flexible in the sense that it does not single out any particular source of relatedness to the 
exclusion of others. We capture relatedness by measuring how often different industries are 
performed together in the same firm, which means that we let local decision makers be the judge 
of what constitutes the relevant source of relatedness (Lien and Klein, 2008; Teece, Rumelt, Dosi 
and Winter, 1994) 
In sum, we believe that our data provides a unique quantitative characterization of what 
explains the choice of target industry, and how firms weigh different variables. Our key findings 
are that relatedness is by far the most important variable in explaining where firms diversify. In 
our sample which consists of four industries a firm does not enter for each industry it does,  a one 
standard deviation increase in relatedness increases the probability of entry with somewhere 
between 25 and 29%. Next comes entry barriers, which - measured as industry concentration- 
decreases the probability of entry with about 5-6%. Other aspects of the target industry and firm 
resources and capabilities are statistically significant, but economically quite insignificant. In 
terms of explanatory power the dominance of relatedness is even more pronounced. Though 
almost all our variables are significant, about 85 % of the explanatory power of our full model 
comes from the relatedness variable. 
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THEORY 
 
The industrial organization literature has documented beyond dispute that industries have 
different profitability levels (i.e. Bain, 1956; McGahan and Porter 1997; Schmalensee, 1989). 
This means that incumbency in some industries is more valuable than in others. But this should 
not, however, be taken to imply that IO-based reasoning suggests that firms should blindly rush 
to enter the industries with the highest growth or profitability levels. High return industries will 
tend to be associated with higher entry costs, and in long run equilibrium one would expect 
differences in return to fully reflect differences in entry costs, so that the expected returns from 
entering a high return industry will generally be no higher than the expected returns from 
entering a low return industry. Similarly, while high growth rates may be positive for incumbents 
- if entry barriers are high – high entry barriers implies that it is difficult for entrants to profit 
from high growth. If entry barriers are low, high growth tends to imply numerous entry attempts, 
depressing the survival chances of each entrant and possibly also the average return of the 
incumbents. General heuristics such as “enter a high growth/return industry” are therefore 
questionable, because such ”rules for riches” cannot exist in equilibrium. 
Nevertheless, empirical evidence strongly suggests that industries are generally not in this 
kind of entry equilibrium, and if they are, they are not likely to remain so for very long (Geroski, 
1995; Baldwin, 1995). Outside equilibrium, it is precisely the tendency for firms to prefer entry 
into high growth, high profitability industries that creates a force tending towards equilibrium. If 
we grant that most industries are outside equilibrium most of the time, then variations in industry 
profitability and -growth should significantly affect entry behavior. Entry behavior is, of course, 
a matter of both new start-up firms, and diversification by existing firms. Our focus here is on 
diversification. Firms making diversification decisions are likely to perceive that they are faced 
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with several potential target industries. A key point in the IO literature, then, is that in choosing 
between these opportunities, firms will display a systematic bias in favor of opportunities in 
attractive target markets. In his 1980 classic, Michael Porter explicitly argued that firms should 
screen potential target markets for the strength of the competitive forces, and make this a key 
factor in entry decisions (Porter, 1980)1.  
There is considerable empirical support for the claim that target market conditions 
influences entry decisions. Entry is positively associated with industry growth, and negatively 
influenced by various types of entry barriers (Baldwin and Gorecki, 1987; Dunne and Roberts, 
1991; Geroski, 1991; Kessides, 1990; Khemani and Shapiro, 1986, 1988; Mata, 1991, 1993; 
Salinger, 1984)2. What is somewhat less clear is the relationship between (historical) profit rates 
and entry. While Geroski (1995) concludes that entry responds only very slowly to profit 
differentials, Siegfried and Evans (1994) concludes that there is a clear positive link. The more 
ambiguous findings on this variable is not entirely surprising given that high profit levels may 
signal high entry costs as much as it signals high expected profits. 
Below we shall use three variables to characterize target market attractiveness. One is 
industry growth, which we expect to increase the probability that a diversifying firm selects a 
given industry. The second is industry concentration, which we use as a summary proxy for entry 
barriers. We expect concentration to be negatively related to the probability that a given industry 
is targeted. The third is industry profitability. Industry profitability is not unrelated to growth and 
concentration, indeed they are conventionally seen as key causes of industry profitability. 
Industry profitability is therefore likely to be somewhat confounded by the former two variables. 
However industry profitability is not fully explained by growth and concentration, so we include 
                                                 
1 An additional argument may be that firms will systematically attempt to develop capabilities that will allow them 
to enter more attractive markets. Thus target market attractiveness will steer capability development. Conversely, 
under the RBV, capability development drives the choice of markets. 
2 Note that this literature as a rule does not distinguish between de novo entry, and entry via diversification. 
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it partly to control for other mechanisms that influence profitability (e.g. substitutes, vertical 
bargaining power, etc.), and partly to because it is possible that decision makers use it as an 
important statistic in its own right. When we use industry profitability in regressions where entry 
barriers are controlled for by the industry concentration variable, we expect it to be positively 
associated with the likelihood of entry. 
The resource based view (henceforth: RBV) takes a different starting point. With Edith 
Penrose’s landmark work on the growth of firms as the point of departure, the RBV of 
diversification sees entry by diversified firms as driven by excess capacity in existing resources 
and capabilities (Penrose, 1959). The choice of target markets are driven primarily by 
considerations about relevance and strength of this excess capacity in various applications, while 
the attractiveness of the target market plays only a secondary role. So where you go depends on 
what you have got (in excess). Relevance is usually summarized by relatedness between a target 
industry and one (or more) of the diversifiers existing industries. There is a long line of studies 
that confirm the idea that some industries are more related than others, and that firms display a 
strong preference for diversification into those that are related to their own (e.g. Chatterjee and 
Wernerfelt, 1991; Farjoun, 1994; Lemelin, 1982; Montgomery and Hariharan, 1991; Silverman 
1999)3. 
In line with the resource-based view one would assume that a diversifying firm will prefer 
target industries where their resources and capabilities are not only relevant, but also emphasize 
using their strongest resources as a basis for diversification. Oddly, the amount of research done 
on the impact of resource strength is dwarfed by the research on resource relevance (i.e. 
relatedness). This is particularly odd because the other main arm of the resource based view, the 
one that focuses on competitive advantage, is all about the importance of resource heterogeneity 
                                                 
3 Note that while there is disagreement as to whether related diversifiers outperforms unrelated there is little doubt 
over the tendency of firms to prefer related diversification. 
Why There?          
 
8
(Barney, 1986, 1991; Dierickx and Cool, 1989; Peteraf, 1993). Nevertheless, we feel safely 
within the confines of the resource based view when we expect to find that firms are more likely 
to target related industries, and more likely to target industries that involves diversification on 
the basis of strong resources. We should emphasize here that by strong we mean both strength 
relative to the other resources in the diversifiers portfolio, and strong relative to competitors. 
Both types of strength are expected to increase the probability of entry, as is relatedness.    
 
DATA AND METHODS 
Sample 
The ideal sample for this work would be a population level sample of all diversification 
decisions made over some period of time. As mentioned above, the AGSM Trinet database is 
such a sample. Trinet contains  biannual records of all U.S. establishements with more than 20 
employees, including variables such as 4-digit SIC code, corporate ownership and sales. It’s been 
found to include 95 % of all the establishments it should, which, unlike Compustat, includes both 
listed and unlisted firms (Voigt, 1993). Trinet covers the period from 1979 through 1989, but 
only the data from 1981, 1983 and 1985 are usable for our purposes. The reason that the data 
from 1979 and 1989 are not usable has do with changes in coding practices in Trinet which 
makes identifying diversification moves uncertain . The 1987 data are also difficult to use 
because the SIC-classification system was changed this year, and there is no unambiguous way 
to convert data between the two versions. This makes it difficult to determine whether a firm 
makes a diversification move between 1985 and 1987, or whether observed changes are due to 
the SIC revision.  
This leaves us with data from 1981, 1983 and 1985. We start with the database from 1981 
and record all industries a given firm was active in i that year.  Next we compare this with the 
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1983 data, and register which new industries each firm had entered between 1981 and 1983. We 
include all diversification moves by all firms in our sample, making it a de facto population level 
record of diversification moves between 1981 and 1983. Note also that we only include firms 
actually making diversification moves. This reflects that our focus is not on why firms diversify, 
nor on whether such firms are different from other firms, but rather on where they go given the 
decision to diversify. Next we repeat the procedure with the data from 1983 and 1985, giving us 
a second sample, containing all diversification moves between 1983 and 1985. In addition to the 
actual diversification moves, for each diversification move by each firm, we randomly select 
four possible target industries that were not chosen by that firm (or already present in the firm’s 
portfolio). So in essence, much of the empirical exercise we describe below involves predicting 
which of the five potential target industries is the one actually entered. We could of course have 
included all industries that were not entered instead of four. However, this would lead to a 
sample completely dominated by non entry. McFadden and Manski (1981) suggest using state 
based sampling in situations when a sample is overwhelmingly characterized by one state, and 
demonstrate that this will provide unbiased and consistent coefficients for all variables except the 
constant term. 
The resulting 1981-1983 sample consists of 2592 firms, that entered 6377 new industries, 
and we added to this 25508 randomly chosen non entries (4 for each case of actual entry), but 
cases with missing data reduced this number to 24980. This means that this sample contains a 
total of 31357 cases. The 1983-1985 sample consists of 2440 firms, that entered 5849 industries. 
We added to this 23396 randomly chosen non entries, but missing data reduced this number to 
23188. The resulting sample therefore contains a total of 29037 cases.  
One drawback of the Trinet database is that it does not provide financial information. This 
means that in order to calculate industry profitability, we had to use financial data from 
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Compustat. This variable is therefore calculated from profitability levels of listed firms only. We 
also used Compustat data to calculate industry growth for 1980-1981, since this cannot be 
calculated using Trinet. So for the first sample our industry growth variable is calculated from 
publicly listed firms only. Industry growth for 1982-1983 is calculated using Trinet, so all firms 
are included in calculating industry growth for the second sample. To examine whether this is a 
problem we correlated sales measures between Trinet and Compustat for the period 1981-1985, 
the resulting correlation is 0.893, which indicates that this not a major problem (also, as seen 
below, the coefficients on industry growth is very similar across the two periods). 
 
Measures 
Our dependent variable is dichotomous. In each of the two samples we record whether a 
firm enters a potential target industry (entry = 1), or not (entry = 0). In the first sample this 
means that the firm enters (or not) after 1981, but before 1983. In the second sample it means 
that the firm enters (or not) after 1983, but before 1985. 
Our independent variables includes two control variables, three variables that aim to capture 
industry attractiveness, and yet another three variables that seeks to capture the relevance and 
strength of the firms preexisting resources and capabilities.  
The two control variables included are designed to control for the possibility that large firms 
may make decisions differently than smaller firms. We control for two aspects of firm size. The 
first, parent sales records total sales by the parent firm as reported in Trinet in the year 
immediately preceding the entry period (e.g. 1981 and 1983, respectively). The second is parent 
diversity, which records the number of industries participated in by the parent. This variable is 
also derived from Trinet in the year preceding the entry period. 
Why There?          
 
11
The first of the industry attractiveness variables is industry concentration. We measure 
industry concentration as the C4 ratio of the target industry in the year preceding the entry 
period. Data from Trinet. 
The second industry variable is industry growth. For industry growth we focus on the two 
years before the entry period. In other words, for entries between 1981 and 1983 we focus on 
industry growth in the period from 1980 to 1981 (note this involves no overlap with the entry 
period), similarly, for entries between 1983 and 1985, we focus on growth in the period 1982 to 
1983. As stated above the measure of industry growth for the former period is calculated from 
Compustat data, while the latter is from Trinet data. In both instances industry growth is 
calculated as the percentage change in aggregated industry sales over the relevant years. For the 
Compustat data we aggregate data from the segment database as well as from non diversified 
firms in the firm level database. 
The third industry level variable is industry profitability. Here too we focus on the two years 
preceding the entry period.  In calculating historical profitability levels for an industry there are 
several options. One can calculate the mean return of all incumbents, or in order to reduce the 
impact of outliers, one can calculate the median return. A third option is to aggregate all returns 
and divide this by all assets in the industry. Unlike the two former options, this provides a size 
weighted measure, or in other words the return on the average dollar invested in the industry. We 
experimented with all three options, but decided on the latter. While the three different options 
yielded materially similar findings, we chose the weighted version simply because it performed 
marginally better in terms of pseudo R2 than using mean or median ROA.  The data for 
computing industry profitability were taken from Compustat. Compustat contains both a segment 
database and a firm level database, we use all the data from the segment database, but only non 
diversified firms from the firm level database. 
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 We now turn to the variables characterizing the relevance and strength of the firms 
preexisting resources and capabilities. In terms of relevance, we measure the variable relatedness 
using the survivor based approach (Lien and Klein, 2008;  Teece et al., 1994). What this measure 
does is capture how related the closest preexisting industry in the parent firms portfolio is to the 
target industry. Put differently we obtain the minimum distance from any industry in the firms 
existing portfolio to the potential target industry4. To compute this we needed a measure of the 
relatedness between all industries in the economy. The survivor based approach used here 
involves estimating how often a given pair of industries is combined by firms, compared to the 
number of combinations one would expect if diversification patterns were random (adjusting for 
industry size). This difference is taken to reflect the degree of relatedness between a given pair of 
industries. I.e. industries are related to the extent that this difference is large and positive, and it 
is negative to the extent that the difference is negative. The procedure was originally developed 
by Teece et al. (1994), and have been evaluated as a measure of relatedness by Lien and Klein 
(2008), who found it to be substantively and consistently superior to the conventional method of 
relying on SIC-distance measures. An advantage of this measure over other types of relatedness 
measures is that it does not single out any particular type of relatedness such as technological 
resources (Jaffe, 1986; Robins and Wiersema, 1995; Silverman, 1999) or human resource 
profiles (Farjoun, 1994). In principle it captures all kinds of relatedness.  Details of how this 
measure is constructed can be found in appendix A. Note though that the data used to find the 
relatedness between all pairs of industries are all diversified firms in the US-economy for the 
relevant year. This data is subsequently used to identify the highest scoring pair between any of 
the existing industries in a firms portfolio, and the target industry. It is the score of this pair that 
                                                 
4 We also experimented with including measures of how close the second closest industry is to the target industry. 
This variable is also highly significant and positively related to actual entry, but the coefficient is substantially 
smaller. When we do not report this, it is because including it means losing all observations of firms with only one 
preexisting industry. This would mean that we no longer have a population level study.  
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constitutes our variable relatedness. We use Trinet data for the year preceding the entry period to 
calculate this variable.  
 The next variable is based on the idea that firms would prefer to diversify on the basis of 
strong resources and capabilities. One measure of strength is whether the firm has above average 
market share in the closest related industry. We calculate the variable share strength by 
measuring the market share of the focal firm in that industry minus the mean market share of all 
firms in that industry, divided by the standard deviation of market share for firms in that 
industry. Therefore share strength measures, in standard deviation units, how far above or below 
average the firm’s market share is. We do acknowledge that market share is not a perfect 
measure of resource strength, but there is no data source that can provide better performance data 
on such a disaggregated level. Also, and more importantly, high market share is consistently 
reported as positively associated with high economic performance (e.g. Gale, 1971; Gale and 
Branch, 1982; Shepard, 1972).  We therefore find this to be a noisy, but acceptable measure. 
This variable is also calculated using Trinet data for the year preceding the entry period. 
 The third and final variable complements the former. The logic is here that the firm will 
want to base expansion on the strongest of its in-house resources and capabilities. We take the 
position that the businesses that constitute the largest part of a firm’s sales are the businesses 
with the strongest resources and capabilities. We therefore again look at the closest related 
existing industry to the potential target industry, and measure how big a share of a firms total 
sales is derived from this business. We use this share to define our final variable intra strength. 
The variable is calculated from Trinet data from the year preceding the entry period. The means, 
standard deviations and correlations of all variables are provided in table 1. 
----------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert table 1 about here 
Why There?          
 
14
------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
Statistical Approach 
In this study the dependent variable is dichotomous, either a potential target industry is 
entered, or it is not. This makes logistic regression appropriate. The general model is the 
following: 
Logit Y = α + β1Parent Sales + β2Parent Diversity + β3Industry  
Concentation+  β4Industry Growth + β5Industry Profitability +   (1) 
β6Relatedness + β7Share Strength + β8Intra Strength + ε 
 
Logit Y is the natural logarithm of the odds that an industry was actually entered : 
 
ln [P(Y=1) / (1-P(Y=1)]      (2) 
 
We are interested in two things from equation (1). We are interested in the estimates of  β3 -  
β8. Through these we can, after suitable transformations, characterize how each of them affects 
the probability of entry, or put differently; how decision makers weigh and trade off the different 
variables when choosing target industry . In addition, we are interested in the contribution from 
the different variables in terms of explaining the dependent variable, analogous to R2 in linear 
regression. Care must be taken in interpreting both the variable coefficients and contributions to 
pseudo R2  since logistic regression is not linear and the dependent variable is the logarithm of 
the odds of entry. 
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FINDINGS 
 
Table 2 presents the outputs from the logistic regressions. We run three sets of models. The 
first set, model 1 and 2, includes only the two control variables. Neither is significant in either of 
the two samples. Next, we add the industry attractiveness variables. As we see from model 3 and 
4 industry concentration is negatively signed as expected, while industry growth is positively 
signed. Industry growth has a much larger coefficient in the last sample, but this difference in 
coefficient size disappears when the resource based variables are added. What is most striking 
about model 3 and 4 is, however, the way industry profitability changes sign between the two 
samples. It is significant and positively signed in the 1981-83 sample, and significant and 
negatively signed in the 1983-85 sample. It is tempting to speculate that this has something to do 
with unrelated diversification going out of fashion during this period. On the other hand, this 
interpretation is somewhat contradicted by model 5 and 6. First, we see that the negative 
coefficient in the later sample loses significance when the resource based variables are added. 
Also, if there was a marked increase in how decision makers value relatedness, one would expect 
the coefficient on relatedness to be larger in model 6 than in model 5.  We actually find that it is 
slightly smaller. Finally, the negative coefficient on the control variable parent diversity in 
model 5 and 6 is also smaller in the later sample, in contrast to what the “unrelated is 
unfashionable” story would predict. Our conclusion is therefore that high historical profitability 
levels is a weak and unclear signal of attractiveness. This is corroborated further below when we 
examine the coefficient sizes and explanatory contribution of the variables in greater detail.  
In general, in the full models (5 and 6) we can see that with the exception of industry 
profitability, all the independent variables are significant, and signed as expected. The coefficient 
sizes in model 5 and  6 are also quite stable across the two samples. All the resource based 
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variables are significant and signed as expected. What is also striking in table 2 is how the model 
performance change. The regression with only the control variable is not significant. As we enter 
the industry attractiveness variables the model becomes significant, with a pseudo R2 of between 
6 .5% and 5.5%. When we add the three resource based variables the pseudo R2 jumps to 
between 40.8% and 35.6%. Evidently the latter group of variables add contribute the most to the 
explanatory power of the model. 
----------------------------------------------------- 
Insert table 2 about here 
--------------------------------------------------- 
From table 2 it can be rather difficult to get a sense of what the coefficient sizes means for 
how decisions are made, and how decision makers are willing to trade off different variables. 
This is particularly difficult in logistic regression, because of the nonlinearity of the model. In 
table 3 we try to make the implications of the coefficient estimates more transparent. In table 3 
we calculate how different changes in each of the independent variables change the probability 
that a potential target industry is actually entered by a diversifying firm. In particular we look at 
a 1 standard deviation (positive) change from the mean, and a 10% and a 100 % change from the 
mean. Note also that all other variables are held at their mean values when the effects of changes 
in a given variable is examined.  
--------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert table 3 about here 
---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
What can be seen from table 3 is that not all variables that are statistically significant are 
substantively significant. In fact, the variables industry growth, industry profitability, and share 
strength all have very little impact on the probability of entry. It would generally take an 
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enormous change in any of these variables to offset small changes in any of the remaining three 
variables, industry concentration, relatedness and intra strength.  In particular, relatedness is by 
far the variable that changes the probability of entry the most. A 1 standard deviation change in 
relatedness increases the probability of entry by somewhere between 25 and 29%. Next comes 
industry concentration. A 1 standard deviation increase in industry concentration reduces the 
probability of entry by between 5 and 6 %. The third substantively significant variable is intra 
strength. As can be recalled this variable measures how big a share of total firm sales that come 
from the closest related industry. A 1 standard deviation increase in this variable increases the 
probability of entry by 3.24%.  
We now turn to examine the explanatory contribution from the individual variables in 
greater detail. Following Menard (2002), we do this by evaluating how the -2*Log Likelihood 
scores in model 5 and 6 from Table 2 can be decomposed into the contribution from the different 
variables5. This is provided in Table 4 below. 
----------------------------------------------- 
  Insert table 4 about here 
----------------------------------------------- 
As we see from table 4, in the neighborhood of 86-88 % of the reduction in -2*Log 
Likelihood comes from the relatedness variable, 7-9% from industry concentration, and all other 
variables contribute less than 2%. We therefore conclude that the relatedness variable completely 
dominates the explanatory power of models 5 and 6 in Table 2. The only other sizable 
contribution comes from industry concentration. The relevance of preexisting resources and 
capabilities together with entry conditions in the target market appears to be what explains entry 
decisions best. 
                                                 
5 We use the backward conditional estimation procedure in SPSS to arrive at these estimates 
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In addition to the findings reported here, we have examined various interaction effects and 
nonlinear terms. Though this work is not completely finalized yet, we have not found anything 
that materially changes the results presented here.  
 
 
CONCLUSIONS AND CAVEATS 
 
Our aim here has been to characterize the choice of target industry by diversifying firms, and 
to do so in quantitative terms. To do so we have examined a population level dataset that 
includes virtually all diversification move made in the US economy in the period 1981-1985, and 
for each actual diversification move, we randomly chose 4 potential target industries that were 
not entered. Our main finding is that the average decision maker is mostly concerned with 
finding destination industries were existing resources and capabilities are relevant, next on the 
list is to avoid industries that are difficult to enter. Also our findings provide some support that 
firms prefer to diversify on the basis of the largest existing businesses, which presumably 
contains the relatively stronger resources and capabilities in the firm’s portfolio. The historic 
growth and profitability of the target market, and the market share performance of the firm in the 
closest related market, matters much less for decision makers. In terms of explanatory power, the 
dominance of relatedness is even more pronounced. 
We were somewhat surprised that the variable share strength did not have a bigger impact. 
This could be attributable to measurement error. Market share performance is certainly not an 
ideal measure of resource strength. Another possibility is that share strength is only relevant 
when relatedness is high. We did examine this issue using interaction terms, but doing so hardly 
contributed any additional explanatory power. Yet another possibility is that many of the firms 
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making diversification decisions are trying to find new arenas to apply resources and capabilities 
that are performing poorly in their existing markets. This is consistent with the story provided by 
authors claiming that the diversification discount is sprurious, and arises because poorly 
performing firms are the ones most likely to diversify (Kampa and Keida, 2002; Maksimovic and 
Phillips, 2002; Villalonga, 2004a, 2004b). This might seem inconsistent with the point above 
about diversifying on the basis of the strongest internal resources and capabilities, but it might be 
the case that a poorly performing large business gives especially strong incentives to attempt 
diversification. 
Nevertheless, we feel it is appropriate to end by pointing out that a large population level 
study such as this inevitably destroys complexity. While the findings reported here may be true 
on average and for the economy as a whole, there will inevitably be many instances involving 
specific firms and specific industries that depart from this picture. However, our goal here has 
been to provide the big picture. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
The calculation of the survivor based measure of relatedness between a given pair of 
industries is based on a procedure originally developed by Teece et al. (1994). Let the universe 
of diversified firms consist of K firms, each active in two or more of I industries. Let Cik = 1 if 
firm k is active in industry i. The number of industries participated in by firm k is mk = ΣiCik and 
the number of diversified firms present in industry i is ni = ΣkCik. Let Jij be the number of 
diversified firms active in both industries i and j, such that Jij = Σk CikCjk. Thus Jij is a count of 
how often industries i and j are actually combined within the same firm. Jij will be larger if 
industries i and j are related, but will also increase with ni and nj. To remove the effect of the size 
of industries i and j, the number Jij is compared with the number of expected combinations if 
diversification patterns were random. 
The random diversification hypothesis can be operationalized as a hypergeometric situation 
where a sample of size ni is drawn (without replacement) from a population of K firms. Those 
chosen are considered active in industry i. A second independent sample of size nj is then drawn 
from the population the population of K firms. Those chosen are considered active in industry j. 
The number xij of firms active in both i and j is then a hypergeometric random variable with 
population K, special members ni and sample size nj. The distribution function for this variable is 
then: 
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The mean and variance of Xij are:  
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A standardized measure of the relatedness between industries i and j is then constructed 
based on the difference between Jij and μij in the following fashion: 
 
ij
ijij
ij
J
SR σ
μ−=
      (6) 
 
The measure SRij is thus a standardized measure of how much the actual number of 
combinations exceeds expected combinations under the random diversification hypothesis. Our 
variable relatedness is defined by identifying the highest score of SRij that can be constructed 
between a potential target industry and any industry the firm in question is already active in. The 
SRij score of that pair defines the variable relatedness.
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Table 1: Means, Standard Deviations , and Correlation Coefficients of Independent Variables, 1981-83 Sample 
 
 
***, **, and * represent statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively. N=31357 for the 1981-83 sample. 
 Mean Standard
Dev. 
Parent  
Sales 
Parent 
Diversity 
Industry 
Conc. 
Industry 
Growth 
Industry 
Prof. 
Relatedn.
 
Share 
Strength 
Intra 
Strength 
Parent  
Sales 
12350 28821 1        
Parent 
Diversity 
17.11 20.47 0.557*** 
 
1       
Industry 
Conc. 
33.67 23.33 0.019*** 
 
0.020*** 
 
1      
Industry 
Growth 
0.20 1.08  0.003 
 
-0.001 
 
0.011**
 
1     
Industry 
Profitability 
0.15 0.19  0.001 
 
0.000 
 
0.034***
 
0.021*** 1    
Relatedness 
 
8.95 9.84 0.139*** 
 
0.236*** 
 
-0.108***
 
0.019***
 
0.002 
 
1   
Share 
Strength 
0.04 0.95 0.164*** 
 
0.061*** 
 
-0.005 
 
0.002 
 
0.006 
 
0.051***
 
1  
Intra  
Strength 
0.16 0.25 -0.219*** 
 
-0.369*** 
 
-0.024***
 
0.002 
 
0.013**
 
-0.043***
 
0.209***
 
1 
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Table 1 (Cont.): Means, Standard Deviations , and Correlation Coefficients of Independent Variables, 1983-85 Sample 
 
 
 Mean Standard
Dev. 
Parent  
Sales 
Parent 
Diversity 
Industry 
Conc. 
Industry 
Growth 
Industry 
Prof. 
Relatedn.
 
Share 
Strength 
Intra 
Strength 
Parent  
Sales 
20548 50023 1        
Parent 
Diversity 
19.60 23.97 0.477***
 
1       
Industry 
Conc. 
33.33 23.07  0.009 
 
0.020*** 1      
Industry 
Growth 
0.32 0.54 0.000 
 
0.001 -0.012** 1     
Industry 
Profitability 
0.17 0.78 -0.003 -0.004 0.058*** -0.005 1    
Relatedness 
 
9.47 10.54 0.137*** 0.249*** -0.105***  0.078*** -0.016*** 1   
Share 
Strength 
0.08 1.09 0.163*** 0.027***
 
-0.013** -0.010 0.000 0.026*** 1  
Intra  
Strength 
0.15 0.25 -0.203*** -0.356*** -0.029*** 0.000 -0.006 -0.057***
 
0.233***
 
1 
 
  
***, **, and * represent statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively. N= 29037 for the 1983-85 sample. 
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Tabel 2: Logistic Regression Output 
 
 
Logistic regressions of the probability of entry into a potential target industry by a diversifying 
firm. Standard errors in parantheses. ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at the 1, 5, 
and 10 percent levels, respectively. N=31357 for models marked 1981-83, N= 29037 for models 
marked 1983-85. 
 
 
 
 
Variable Model 1 
1981-83 
Model 2 
1983-85 
Model 3 
1981-83 
Model 4 
1983-85 
Model 5 
1981-83 
Model 6 
1983-85 
Parent  
Sales 
0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
Parent 
Diversity 
0.000 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.014*** 
(0.001) 
-0.011*** 
(0.001) 
Industry 
Concentration 
  -0.023*** 
(0.001) 
-0.023*** 
(0.001) 
-0.023*** 
(0.001) 
-0.022*** 
(0.001) 
Industry 
Growth 
  0.073*** 
(0.011) 
0.194*** 
(0.026) 
0.062*** 
(0.014) 
0.056* 
(0.031) 
Industry 
Profitability 
  0.222** 
(0.089) 
-0.071** 
(0.033) 
0.232** 
(0.109) 
-0.040 
(0.032) 
Relatedness 
 
    0.152*** 
(0.002) 
0.125*** 
(0.002) 
Share 
Strength 
    0.071*** 
(0.017) 
0.057*** 
(0.015) 
Intra  
Strength 
    0.935*** 
(0.072) 
0.891*** 
(0.073) 
Constant 
 
-
1.374*** 
(0.018) 
-1.380*** 
(0.019) 
-0.737*** 
(0.030) 
-0.764*** 
(0.030) 
-2.328*** 
(0.046) 
-2.096*** 
(0.044) 
-2LL 
 
31672.29 29175.30 30527.21 28143.27 22244.98 21753.25 
Model  χ2 
 
0.52 0.037 1145.60*** 1032.07*** 9427.83 7422.01 
Nagelkerke 
R2 
 
0.000 0.000 0.065 0.055 0.408 0.356 
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Table 3: Change in the Probability of Entry for Given Changes of Independent 
Variables   
 
 
 
The table shows the change in the probability of entry for different positive changes in the 
independent variables.   1 standard deviation change from the mean, 10% increase from the 
mean, and a 100% increase from the mean. The effects are calculated holding all other 
variables than the focal at their mean values. Results for both the 1981-83 sample and the 
1983-85 sample are included. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 + 1SD  
1981-83 
+ 1SD  
1983-85 
+ 10% 
1981-83 
+ 10%  
1983-85 
+ 100% 
1981-83 
+ 100% 
1983-85 
Industry  
Concentr. 
-5,46% -5,40% -0,93% -0,91% -7,25% 7,19% 
Industry  
Growth 
0,85% 0,45% 0,01% 0,02% 0,16% 0,23 
Industry  
Prof 
0,55% NA 0,04% NA 0,46% NA 
Related- 
ness 
28,89% 24,95% 1,79% 1,59% 25,40% 21,78% 
Share  
Strength 
0,87% 0,81% 0,00% 0,00% 0,03% 0,04% 
Intra  
Strength  
3,24% 3,13% 0,19% 0,17% 1,99% 1,81% 
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Table 4: Effects of adding each independent variable to Model 5 
 
Variable Change in -2 * 
Log Likelihood 
Significance  
of change 
Percent of total 
Parent  
Sales 
0.411 0.521 0.00% 
Parent  
Diversity 
157.74 0.000 1.73% 
Industry  
Concentration 
702.45 0.000 7.70% 
Industry  
Growth 
4.71 0.030 0.05% 
Industry 
Profitability 
20.34 0.000 0.22% 
Relatedness 
 
8055.07 0.000 88.32% 
Share  
Strength 
17.55 0.000 0.19% 
Intra  
Strength 
161.96 0.000 1.78% 
 
Table 4 (Cont.): Effects of adding each independent variable to Model 6 
 
Variable Change in -2 * 
Log Likelihood 
Significance  
of change 
Percent of total 
Parent  
Sales 
2.63 0.105 0.04% 
Parent  
Diversity 
161.33 0.000 2.25% 
Industry  
Concentration 
624.73 0.000 8.71% 
Industry  
Growth 
3.16 0.075 0.04% 
Industry 
Profitability 
1.79 0.181 0.02% 
Relatedness 
 
6223.11 0.000 86.73% 
Share  
Strength 
14.28 0.000 1.99% 
Intra  
Strength 
144.18 0.000 2.01% 
